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Within the contemporary shipping industry there is the potential for open registers 
to act to varying degrees as “regulatory havens”. There are also well-known chal-
lenges relating to regulatory enforcement at both port-state and flag-state levels. In 
this context it is particularly helpful to consider the potential drivers of corporate 
social responsibility (CSR) within the commercial cargo shipping industry. This paper 
therefore considers three case studies, to explore: supply chain pressures relating to 
the exercise of CSR; financial drivers of CSR; the role of paternalism in the exercise 
of CSR; and normative orientations towards CSR in the shipping industry. The paper 
concludes that on the whole, the shipping industry is more concerned to focus on 
the protection of the environment, in conjunction with its CSR policies, than it is to 
focus on the health and welfare of sea-based employees. Furthermore, it explains the 
reasons for such prioritization.
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Capitalist modes of production in contemporary nations can gener-ally be characterized as involving the interconnected yet contradictory interests of states, workers, managers and entrepreneurs/investors. Within Europe, in the post (Second) World War period, states and state 
regulation generally gained a tighter grip on the regulation of national indus-
tries, introducing increasingly stringent standards relating to labour rights and 
environmental protection. Concurrently, in many developed economies worker 
representation strengthened and living standards rose. In search of greater 
opportunities for profit many companies began to look overseas and “offshore” 
for locations in which they could operate with less regulation, lower labour costs 
and lower taxation (Sampson and Ellis, 2015). In this context, regulatory havens 
(Kneller and Manderson, 2009; Neumayer, 2001; Dam and Scholtens, 2012; 
Preuss, 2012) have facilitated the use of child labour (Zutshi et al., 2009) and 
environmental degradation (Manteaw, 2008; Muradian et al., 2003; Newell, 
2005) as countries desperate for development, and people desperate to survive, 
submit to terms and conditions no longer deemed acceptable in the developed 
world.
In shipping, such regulatory havens also exist and these have taken the form 
of vessel registers that exercise little or no regulatory control over their fleets, 
choosing to operate as commercial, profit-making entities. As early as the 1950s 
and 1960s national ship registers witnessed the steady loss of vessels from 
their registers, as shipping companies chose to “flag out” to “open registers” 
(also known as “flags of convenience”) abroad, which presented fewer hurdles 
to the maximization of profits.1 As markets tightened in the 1970s, it became 
increasingly difficult for operators to stay in business unless they flagged-out 
(Sampson, 2013) and today 71% of the world fleet (by tonnage) is registered with 
open registers (UNCTAD, 2015). Such registers frequently ratify international 
conventions and it has been argued that many register newer, and therefore 
better quality, tonnage (UNCTAD, 2015). However, it remains the case that with 
regard to the enforcement of regulation, open registers (which are themselves 
often established for purely commercial reasons) can generally be described 
as more lax than national registers. Furthermore, their very presence exercises 
downward pressures on flag state regulation as a whole, as national registers 
seek to resist the flight of their tonnage by exercising greater leniency in opera-
tional matters. This is sometimes achieved via the establishment of (national) 
second registers which may, for example, sanction lower minimum manning 
levels (Winchester et al., 2006). Evidence of the lower standards demanded by 
open registers, such as Tanzania and Moldova, can be found on examination 
 1 The state where a vessel is registered is known as the “Flag state” for that vessel. Flag states 
are responsible for ratifying and enforcing international standards on board their vessels. 
Formerly, most vessels were flagged in the same country as they were owned. Vessels 
which are flagged with other countries (i.e. not where they are owned) are referred to as 
having “flagged out”. Broadly speaking, national registers are those which require vessels 
to be owned or managed locally, in some sense. Open registers are those which make no 
demands on vessel owners with regard to the location of their business. 
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of the detention and deficiency records of port state inspectorates, which show 
these registers to be over-represented (e.g. Paris MoU, 2014). 
The problems associated with ineffective regulation by flag states has led 
to the emergence of regulatory enforcement in relation to vessels calling at 
national port states (known across the sector as “port-state control”). This has 
been characterized as more effective than regulatory control via flag states by 
some authors (Sampson and Bloor, 2007), but it is also patchy and inconsistent 
(Bloor et al., 2006; Hjorth, 2015), notwithstanding the development of what 
might be regarded as “clubs” of port states (DeSombre, 2006) which act to 
equalize standards of enforcement across particular regions, via the implementa-
tion of memoranda of understanding (e.g. the Paris MoU). 
The importance of corporate social responsibility
As public attention has been drawn to the consequences of both poor regula-
tion and regulatory avoidance that is so frequently associated with offshoring 
and outsourcing, we have seen an increased emphasis in business circles on 
the public exercise of CSR (Sampson and Ellis, 2015). CSR has been defined as 
encompassing voluntary corporate activities which are motivated by a concern 
for the environment or for the interests of wider society. As such, CSR can be 
understood as corporate actions which are neither driven by regulatory require-
ments nor by normal business practices oriented towards profit maximization 
(Carroll, 1999; McWilliams and Siegel, 2001). 
As a result of the media exposure of a number of exploitative and destruc-
tive practices by multinational corporations, such as tax avoidance, poor labour 
standards and environmental destruction (Kneller and Manderson, 2009; 
Neumayer, 2001; Dam and Scholtens, 2012; Preuss, 2012; Zutshi et al, 2009; 
Manteaw, 2008; Muradian et al., 2003; Newell, 2005), many multinational 
corporations have been keen to develop written policies relating to their freshly 
established CSR agendas (Zyglidopoulos, 2002). This has been the case in rela-
tion to high profile “brands” in particular, as well as larger corporations, which 
occupy positions of higher social visibility than their smaller counterparts. 
In the transport sector, alongside their land-based competitors, larger ship-
ping companies and those operating in “sensitive” sectors such as oil and gas, 
have also developed an interest in the espousal of ethically responsible busi-
ness operations (see Arat, 2011 for example). However, the focus of their efforts 
and their motivation in making them is complex. There are suggestions in the 
wider literature that such activities can take the form of “window dressing”, 
sometimes termed “greenwash” in relation to environmental CSR. In relation to 
this, authors (for example Robinson, 2010) argue that CSR may be seen as little 
more than an exercise in public relations, inasmuch as the corporate policies 
outlined in glossy brochures may have little beneficial impact in reality and may 
not reflect any genuine commitment on the part of corporations to protect the 
environment or have a positive social impact. From the published literature, it is 
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possible to identify three major potential drivers of the adoption of CSR policies 
by companies with regard to health and safety and environmental compliance: 
the role of corporate reputation and its impact on customer choices (Walters et 
al., 2012; Zyglidopoulos, 2002); the role of the belief that the exercise of CSR 
results in better financial performance (Griffin and Mahon, 1997; Roman et al., 
1999; Molina Azorín et al., 2009; Van Den Berg and De Langen, 2016); and the 
role of paternalism and normative affiliations to CSR (Sampson et al., 2014). 
Strictly speaking, and as described earlier, it is only when CSR is driven by the 
latter motivation that it can be seen as “genuine” CSR which encompasses activi-
ties which go beyond regulatory minimum requirements and are not simply 
about the pursuit of profit maximization (Carroll, 1999). 
The research question addressed in this paper concerns the drivers for the 
exercise of CSR in the shipping industry. The paper uses the broader litera-
ture relating to CSR to specifically explore the potential drivers for CSR in the 
shipping industry. It considers the views of managers and workers within 
companies in relation to the multiple motivations which may lie behind the 
establishment of CSR policies by corporations. This approach is revealing in a 
way that is not common in the general CSR literature and has not been uncov-
ered in the previous literature in relation to the shipping industry. The paper 
considers what motivates the development of CSR in relation to three case study 
shipping companies. In doing so it reveals the multiple and entangled motiva-
tions for both the visible and the invisible exercise of CSR. 
The paper is structured as follows: a discussion of the methods used, a pres-
entation of the findings from three case studies followed by a conclusion.
Methods
This paper draws on three case studies, considered in conjunction with three 
different projects, all of which were concerned with understanding corporate 
approaches to risk in relation to accidents at sea involving personnel and the 
environment. In relation to each project, the methodology was informed by the 
principles of grounded theory. This approach allows for the generation of theory 
following the patterns identified in collected data. In this sense it reverses the 
positivist approach to science, which generally begins with the establishment 
of a theory and sets out to test this using empirical evidence. 
The selected cases can be described as “revelatory”, in line with Yin’s defini-
tion (Yin, 2003). However while it is more usual for revelatory cases to be pre-
sented singly, here three cases are examined providing a multiple case approach. 
The rationale in selecting three cases for examination is in order to strengthen 
the overall robustness of the findings (Herriott and Firestone, 1983). Here the 
intention is to use a replication logic (Yin, 2003) to consider whether the drivers 
which emerge in relation to the development of CSR policies in different kinds 
of shipping companies (in terms of sector of operation and size) are the same 
or whether they differ. However, there is no suggestion that the cases constitute 
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perfect replicas of one another, as these were qualitative studies which were 
designed to be flexible and to maximize our understanding of the orientations 
and meanings of key actors within the field. 
The earliest case study (Vizla) was selected from the tanker sector, where regu-
latory standards are high and where there is also considerable sensitivity with 
regard to business reputation, given that the customers for tanker companies 
(known as charterers) are particularly concerned to protect their international 
reputations and to avoid the brand image damage that is caused by oil spills 
(as was the case, for example, with the well-publicized oil spill from the Exxon 
Valdez). The case study was originally developed as part of a wider project con-
cerning the corporate management of risk to vessels or personnel (Sampson 
et al., 2013; Sampson, 2011). Vizla was once a family owned business but today 
(as at the time of the research) it is a successful shareholder-owned tanker 
company specializing in the carriage of oil and related products. 
The second case study was related to a container ro-ro (roll on–roll off) vessel 
operated by a small ship-management company. Here the potential drivers for 
the development of CSR policies are less readily apparent, as container ro-ros 
carry cargo belonging to very many charterers, each of which is unlikely to 
suffer reputational damage with regard to any incidents concerning social or 
environmental damage. Equally the company owning and operating the vessel 
is not considered to have a big “brand” reputation attached to it and is relatively 
anonymous in terms of the general perceptions of the public. The study was 
conducted as part of a project considering the impact of supply chain influ-
ences on corporate health and safety management on-board vessels. The case 
study company (QPR) had placed five of its ro-ro vessels under contract with 
an independent ship-manager which we named Eagle ship-management (see 
also Walters et al., 2012). QPR itself was owned by the parent company Griffin 
which was, and remains, a family-owned multinational fully integrated logistics 
group with a ro-ro/container fleet of 100 vessels. As with the case study of Vizla, 
this research incorporated a focus on both shore-side managers and sea-staff. 
The final case study (Swan) was selected as it represents a very large, well-
known container shipping company and a globally renowned “brand”. Swan 
was, and remains, a major owner/operator with significant tanker and con-
tainer fleets. Originally a fully family-owned company, the organization is now 
stock-exchange listed; however the family retain significant holdings and some 
influence. In this case study it was only the container side of the operation that 
was the focus (see Table 1). 
Like Vizla, Swan is a large company with a corporate image to preserve. 
However, unlike Vizla but in common with the much smaller company, QPR, 
the company carries cargo for many charterers and may not be expected to be 
under the same commercial pressures as Vizla to operate in an environmentally 
and socially responsible way. The case was constructed in relation to research 
undertaken as part of two projects: the aforementioned study of health and 
safety management from which shore-side data were drawn; and a subsequent 
project relating to ship–shore personnel interaction from which the shipboard 
data were drawn. 
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Table 1 Summary of case study company relevant characteristics
Sector Size Charterers 
Vizla Tanker Medium Single per voyage
QPR Container ro-ro Small Multiple per voyage
Swan Container Large Multiple per voyage
The methods underpinning all three cases combined a single voyage with 
each company involving ethnographic methods of observation and interview-
ing (informal and formal) and a number of qualitative formal interviews with 
shore-side personnel. The case studies were conducted over an extended period 
between 2006 and 2015. In total 22 interviews were conducted with shore-side 
personnel including those involved in health and safety and quality issues, 
procurement and fleet management. A further 38 formal interviews were con-
ducted with seafarers of all ranks on board. In line with the grounded theory 
approach that was adopted in each case study, the exercise of corporate social 
responsibility (CSR) emerged as either a central or a peripheral concern.
In all cases pseudonyms are used in relation to companies, vessels and par-
ticipants. Field notes were maintained throughout the voyages and these have 
been analysed and coded using NVivo. Interviews were recorded, transcribed 
and coded using NVivo and both the coded material and the full transcripts have 
been revisited in the course of the development of this paper. 
Potential drivers of CSR in shipping: three illuminating  
case studies
The case of Vizla
Vizla produces a considerable amount of literature relating to its commitment 
to people and to the environment. Like Swan, it is conscious of its public image 
and publishes annual “sustainability” or CSR reports online. The company 
operates in the tanker sector, which is both highly regulated and highly sensitive 
to issues of compliance. Not only do charterers in this sector expect companies 
to avoid detentions and deficiencies at the hands of port state control, they also 
operate their own independent inspection regime and share results of inspec-
tions between them. Additionally they make demands on companies in terms of 
crew competence, training and experience, and they regularly audit companies 
to ensure compliance with their exacting standards. 
In this context it is unsurprising to find that Vizla exhibits a high public com-
mitment to both employee safety and to safe operations from an environmental 
perspective. This is demonstrated visually in the production of rafts of company 
safety information posters, videos and newsletters, as one seafarer described: 
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“They have posters, movies, everything … you can read, you can see. [Even] if you 
don’t like to see, you see! So this is like … safety’s around us!” (Vizla seafarer).
However further probing established that, within Vizla, the emphasis was 
very much on behavioural safety. This is a relatively inexpensive method of 
being seen to be committed to safety and to raising safety standards. It also has 
the potential to allow the company to distance itself from the costs of injuries 
to personnel as well as environmental damage at sea if, and when, they occur 
after deviation from standard operating procedures and safety management 
systems. Thus the company was seen by seafarers to be apparently committed to 
safety and yet to avoid expensive remedies to safety concerns such as increasing 
crewing levels in order to mitigate fatigue. Seafarers understood the company 
to be cost-sensitive and to need to make a profit and as one said “at the end of 
the day the company has to make money … has to!” They interpreted this as 
meaning that there were limits to the prioritization of safety (particularly with 
regard to fatigue management) and that ultimately operational considerations, 
and cost considerations had to take precedence. The following comments from 
a seafarer sum up the commonly held view:
Seafarer: Bang! All power shuts down for some reason! What do you say? “I haven’t 
got my sleep, I’m going to stay in bed”? But part of your job is to fix it, that’s my 
job, so you’ve got to go down there and fix it… or you say “no” because you have 
worked a specific time?
Helen: What does the company want you to do? Would the company support you?
Seafarer: The company wouldn’t say anything, as long as nothing happened.
Helen: And when something happened?
Seafarer: They’d say “how long have you been up?” If there was a major disaster, 
something really happened, oh yeah, of course they would. But then if I hadn’t done 
it, what would have happened if I hadn’t done it?
Shore-side managers suggested that this was a misinterpretation of company 
priorities by seafarers, and suggested that they were needlessly afraid of inform-
ing shore-side management of situations where more time was required on 
board to accomplish a task, or to deal with a situation before loading or unload-
ing a cargo, for example. However, seafarers had a rather different account and 
stories circulated within the company about captains who had been dismissed 
following delays resulting from decisions to allow seafarers to sleep, following 
demanding situations where rest hours could not be observed. These stories 
added to the fear factor and the perception that safety was cost-constrained and 
was very much something that seafarers were expected to “pull off”, even in 
the absence of proper resources. One manager who recognized the fear among 
seafarers explained how:
When they [shore based managers] are pushed for cutting times … then they [the 
seafarers] will, maybe not state their case that they need more time “we need prepa-
ration … what takes two hours here will maybe take three or four hours” and this 
they are afraid to say (Vizla shore side manager).
Another described the ways in which profits remained a paramount concern 
of the company despite their espousal of “safety above all else”. He explained 
that:
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Yeah cost is … probably racing far ahead of the safety factor, yeah. It is because I am 
quite sure that companies like Vizla have to answer to shareholders and sharehold-
ers need to see [a] reduction in budgets, not increases. Sad but true (Manager: Vizla).
In more detailed ways, the company priorities gradually came to be revealed 
in the course of the case study. In particular, the manner in which the company 
operated at compliance level with regard to safety but at “beyond compliance” 
level with regard to some areas of environmental protection. One example of this 
related to the provision of survival suits for seafarers. In some companies, at the 
time of the case study, seafarers were routinely provided with a survival suit in 
their cabin. However, at Vizla the regulatory minimum number of survival suits 
were provided on board. Consequently, these were only available to the members 
of the small fast rescue boat team on board. This situation pertained until the 
international regulations relating to survival suits were amended, whereupon 
the company was concerned to comply with the changes “ahead of time”, to 
promote an image of responsibility. Until this occurred, survival suits had not 
been prioritized by the shore-side team responsible for safety, because of the 
budgetary constraints within which they operated. As one manager explained:
I think it is definitely at the back of the mind [cost] because, like everything else, 
even the safety budget is a certain amount and there are probably times when I’ve 
cut items because it could have exceeded the ship’s budget (Manager Vizla).
However, this situation did not apply to issues of environmental protection 
and, at the time of the case study, the company had just lifted all budgetary 
constraints relating to pollution avoidance. This was driven largely by the sub-
stantial fines that had been introduced in the USA for ships breaching both 
international and local environmental regulations. A manager described the 
company decision as follows:
I guess from the company point of view they are just looking at the cost factor. Let’s 
face it, regardless of how much they talk about safety, they finally count the cost 
factor. One good example of it, unfortunately … is that … the recent environmental 
litigation that happened in the States, the senior management has now lifted budg-
etary control over environmentally related equipment on board. Now, unfortunately, 
nothing like that has been done … for safety procurement. I mean, if you can, take 
up budgetary control over the environment just because they are probably going 
to affect you [financially] sitting here ashore why couldn’t you do that for, well, you 
know [seafarer safety]. It wouldn’t be considered for their safety because it only 
affects the seafarers out there. A sad fact of life, but it’s true! (Manager Vizla) 
Overall it appeared that Vizla, as a large shareholder corporation operating in 
a highly regulated environment, was motivated very much by the “bottom line” 
when it came to considerations of both regulatory compliance and environmen-
tal protection. The promotion of a responsible image was described as important 
in relation to charterers and shareholders, and this public image related to both 
employee safety and marine protection. However, when faced with additional 
financial incentives, in the shape of a desire to avoid massively punitive fines and 
litigation, the company placed considerable priority on the protection of the envi-
ronment in its resource allocation. Among seafarers and managers there was a 
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strong perception that the company was now governed by a board whose ethos 
was profit generation and business success, and that CSR would be practised and 
espoused where this aligned with these objectives. The normative attachments 
to CSR which were said to have existed when the company was family-owned 
were believed to have disappeared, since the paternalistic owner who previously 
ran the company had been replaced by a board and shareholders.
The case of Eagle
There was little doubt that in Eagle ship-management, the priority was for 
vessels to meet the standards established via international regulation and to 
avoid deficiencies and detentions from port state control authorities. This was 
the main objective for the company, which was very keen to market itself as a 
“quality operator”; a reputation that it was keen to establish via its record vis-à-
vis the results from port state inspections.
Eagle’s main client in the operation of its fleet of container/ro-ros was a large 
shipper, QPR, which, in turn, had developed a series of relationships with com-
panies wishing to transport vehicles and/or containers between the USA and 
Europe. It was evident from the interviews that Eagle was not under pressure 
from QPR with regard to the protection of its relationships with charterers. 
Indeed, many managers at Eagle had very little insight into the relationships 
between QPR and even its larger clients, as the following comment demonstrates:
Helen: And so do you get the feeling that the relationship is a very good one between 
[QPR] and their customers?
Eagle manager: I don’t really have any knowledge about that, but they keep on using 
us so yeah I think so. And since we go the same route all the time, almost like a 
ferry, so we have got our route so the same company use us for the same cargo on 
a regular basis. Of course I believe [QPR] owners are very keen on keeping those 
contracts, I think the relationship is good but I don’t know.
Alongside one or two major clients, including a well-known car company 
and a furniture retailer, QPR also offered services to smaller clients. From the 
perspective of Eagle these small clients remained anonymous and very difficult 
to identify, as one manager described:
[...] it is not so easy to see who the customer is, there is a total mix of cargo if you 
have seen, and looking for the container who is this container, they borrow it just 
for this but it is another name on it. I have to dig very deep, and if I have to find out 
who it is (Eagle manager).
QPR’s clients were generally reported by both seafarers and shore-side 
managers to take little interest in health and safety or the environment and its 
protection, and were rather more concerned with transporting their cargoes in 
clean ships (i.e. relatively grease and dust free) without incurring damage. More 
generally, they were regarded by staff at Eagle (both managers and seafarers) to 
be more sensitive to price than to health and safety and the maintenance of the 
vessel. One manager explained: “I think the customers if they find a cheaper 
solution I think they would take that” (Eagle manager).
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While a seafarer put it like this:
The people on board we are still very old fashioned, we would like to have a nice 
vessel and so on, but I don’t think that for the ship owner it is priority number 1. 
For us on board it is and we have to fight and explain why we would like to do this. 
But I think that is more now the last 10 or 15 years than it was before because if the 
customer saw a very nice vessel and they were on board and everything was more or 
less perfect they have got that customer, the customer is more sensible today, they 
look for the price. We can freight over 10 containers for half the price, they don’t 
care about how it looks like (seafarer on board Sea Hawk).
However, both seafarers and office personnel cited one exceptional example 
of a company which was one of QPR’s major customers and which sent auditors 
to the vessel. This company took a much broader interest in the ship and living 
conditions than other customers of the charterer. A seafarer described how:
Seafarer: They were interested in the crew and how the crew are living, and they 
were looking in the cabins, and there was a lot of that because they also get some 
complaints. Scan Co from Sweden, I can say there has been a big discussion about 
them buying things from workers from India and their children and there was a lot 
of things like that. But we don’t get these problems here but they were very interested 
about that and the standard of the cabins and that.
Helen: And did you see anything improve on board after that? Did the company 
respond in any way to the [Scan Co] interest?
Seafarer: We didn’t get any responses, so I cannot say that we are better or worse 
than before. We have that standard and we are still keeping it.
Helen: Do any of the other customers come on board to look at these things?
Seafarer: Um yes, [Company Name 30]. We take cars for them so they are on board 
very often, a couple of times 3, 4 or 5 times a year it depends.
Helen: And do they take an interest in health and safety and the seafarers?
Seafarer: No they are more interested about their cargo. But [Scan Co] was very much 
more interested in what I was thinking from the beginning, but after when I thought 
about it is because they got a lot of complaints and that is also the thing about money.
Notwithstanding this exceptional example, client relationships overwhelm-
ingly lacked influence on standards of health, safety and environmental pro-
tection on board and, as a result, there was very little incentive for Eagle to 
demonstrate credentials with regard to the exercise of CSR in the sense of going 
beyond existing regulatory requirements relating to both health and safety and 
the environment. However, in the absence of such pressures from the “supply 
chain”, it was interesting to note that among shore side managers there was a 
perception that safety mattered for its own sake, and there were remnants of 
a normative attachment to safety that appeared to relate to specific personnel 
in the company and the constitution of the board of directors. However this 
paternalistic desire to exercise CSR was tangled up inseparably with the desire 
to market the company’s regulatory compliance and, unlike the case of Swan 
(where the priority was on environmental protection), the company had not 
established clear priorities to operate “beyond compliance” in any single sphere. 
The mixed motivations behind corporate priorities were expressed in a number 
of ways and included the comment that:
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[the company priority] is care for the individual and everyone else around, but the 
individual comes first. I mean you read any ISM manual and the master has over-
riding authority to save a life. Life comes first, safety at sea, SOLAS… Within this 
company the promotion is, that is as [the general manager] says that is one of our 
selling points to the clients is we have a safety culture (Eagle manager 39).
[The ] Priority [for Eagle] is to keep the management [contract with QPR] I guess 
and to make a profit out of it… But of course if they have any accident on board 
which then comes out because we didn’t have that or because ISM was wrong that 
would not please the management at all. So of course that leads to safety work as 
well … but I think the management priority is profit and to keep the management 
(seafarer on board Sea Hawk).
Thus, although customer perceptions and demands were not seen as driving 
the company to demonstrate that it went beyond minimum regulatory stand-
ards in terms of safety or protection of the environment, reputation in relation 
to regulatory compliance was important to the company and it wished to be 
identified as a “safe operator” at the quality end of the market. At the same time 
“quality” operators in this sector were seen to be those with consistent records of 
regulatory compliance. There was no pressure from customers to demonstrate 
efforts to exercise CSR in relation to voluntary standards. Similarly there was 
no evidence at all that managers perceived any savings to be associated with the 
exercise of CSR. Their comments were more indicative of an awareness that the 
preservation of life at sea was a basic human value but that the pursuit of safety 
came at a cost. Consequently they suggested that the imperatives of economic 
success limited the company’s aspirations with regard to voluntary standards.
The case of Swan
Like staff at Vizla, the shore-side management at Swan were clear in stating that 
their priorities, as a company, lay in the protection of the environment and that 
this took precedence over concerns with sea-staff and their health and safety. 
At the beginning of an interview with two key senior managers responsible for 
health and safety (including environmental safety) this was made evident when 
they described how:
There is no doubt that it is evident from our sustainability record that the environ-
mental aspect is the prime mover force. As we say on safety, health and safety, we 
are more on what we would call a compliance level (Swan managers interview 2011).
They went on to describe how the company was concerned to achieve regu-
latory compliance with regard to seafarer health and safety, but in terms of 
environmental issues they stated that they wished to perform at a level that 
was better than that.2 In short their priority for the exercise of CSR, in going 
beyond regulatory minimum standards, was environmental protection. They 
explained it in this way:
 2 The company was not pressed on which specific areas of environmental protection they 
were least interested in pursuing.
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[In relation to environmental issues] we are moving from compliance to become 
more beyond [compliance], but as the illustration here clearly also shows, [points 
to graphic in a report he has with him] what we are driven by is the environmental 
issue should rank [highest] and that has a highest number [priority] in Swan [...]. 
That said and I think it is also important to stress that it is not because health 
and safety is not important but that [putting the environment first] is the view the 
company has in differentiating between what is actually included in the HSE work 
(Swan manager interview 2011).
For Swan the drive to present publicly “green” credentials was linked to the 
perception of what customers in their sector wanted. They identified more 
pressures from charterers to perform well in relation to health and safety in 
the tanker sector than they did in the container sector, where customers were 
not very interested in these matters. In the container sector customers did, 
however, take an interest in environmental issues such as “carbon footprint”. 
In their words:
Swan manager no 1: There is no doubt that if we compare ourselves with the tanker 
industry which as you have been doing, they have a lot of industry drivers for safety 
and health. And some are not really active or present in the container industry, not 
the customer focus…
Swan manager no 2: And you can say that where the tanker world is driven by the 
oil majors and they are looking very harsh into the safety part, then our industry at 
least you can say that the big shippers are, for them it is more important to show 
the buyer of any product that it has been transported in an environmental friendly 
way. So it is a little bit the opposite.
Helen: So you see the buyers as having more of an interest in the environmental 
side than in the health and safety on board kind of thing?
Swan manager no 1: That is how our company has assessed it, that the environmen-
tal and that is very much because we have a lot more customers than for example 
tankers, they may be concentrated on 20/50 customers, we have a lot more and 
people can probably use us, can much easily relate to CO2 emissions, environmental 
friendliness and hence this is a driver for us compared to safety. But as my officer 
said that does not mean that we do not prioritize safety, it is still important and we 
still have zero fatalities goals, we still have zero serious accident goals, we want to 
reduce our number of LTIs [lost time injuries] and work accidents etc. and which is 
basically what our function is working towards, improving safety as well, but from 
an “all company” perspective the priority is clear. What is our difference [to our 
competitors] commercially, that is the environment.
Swan manager no 2: We can say that the big shippers [i.e. clients/charterers] … for 
them it is more important to get an environmentally good looking emission foot-
print than the safety… We know that Companies like Scan Co, and Market King and 
these big shippers they are looking very much at the environmental footprint … And 
what we provide for each customer on that … they get a survey on a monthly basis 
where they can see how much they have actually saved in respect of CO2 and emis-
sions in general compared to if they had used, well compared to other companies 
(Swan manager interview 2011).
Managers at Swan made reference to commercial success and the links 
between these and CSR but they did not recognize direct links between CSR 
and better financial performance per se. In teasing out the company’s priorities 
and the drivers behind these, it became apparent that the public profile of the 
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Swan brand, both nationally and internationally, was a huge driver in relation to 
health and safety and environmental performance. This profile was considered 
by the management to be more significant in terms of influence on practice 
than the “family values” that were considered to underpin the corporation. As 
one manager explained “we have our values and we would hope that would 
apply irrespectively of who owned us”. Nevertheless, despite the company his-
tory it seemed that the priorities of the shore-side management at Swan were 
not driven by paternalism or strong normative affiliations (although managers 
professed to hold these) to the extent that they were driven by market considera-
tions and sensibilities. 
At sea priorities were interpreted a little differently. On board the vessel 
Beluga seafarers had incorporated environmental awareness into all opera-
tional matters and, in order to meet their personal key performance indicators 
(KPIs), the vessel had to maintain particular speeds and revs per minute (low 
energy consumption or “slow steaming”). This focus had become ingrained 
in practice to the extent that it was not a matter for debate or discussion but 
merely a “given” on board. However, adhering to safety standards (person-
nel) had also been linked in some ways to KPIs. In one illustrative incident, 
there was some dismay among the seafarers aboard Beluga when a young 
fourth engineer cut his hand and required hospital treatment ashore. Rather 
than sympathy from some officers there was irritation, and the captain made 
immediate reference to the impact on one of his KPIs. The incident prompted 
the following field note:
The fourth engineer has cut his hand. The captain has heard about it and asks the 
chief officer to check whether or not the fourth engineer requires stitches ashore. 
He does not appear sympathetic in any way in fact rather the opposite as he com-
plains that his “bloody KPI is blown”. Later, when the Chief and Captain have left 
the mess room the fourth engineer arrives. He looks bashful when the electrical 
engineer sympathetically asks about his hand. I have the feeling he feels ashamed 
as though he is to blame for his accident (in keeping with the message that all 
the safety literature on board promulgates). When I let him know that the chief is 
looking for him to see if he needs to go ashore for stitches he leaves his lunch and 
comes to stand near me and tell me what happened. “I didn’t do it deliberately” he 
says earnestly… (Beluga field notes 2015).
This incident implied that on board, seafarers did not strongly differentiate 
between company safety priorities and environmental priorities, despite the 
fact that the company itself clearly identified the environment as its priority. 
However, there were indications that seafarers were aware that the company was 
less concerned to pursue proactive safety policies than proactive environmental 
policies, and that many of the safety concerns enshrined by the company in 
management practices derived directly from regulation and a desire to comply 
with it rather than a commitment to voluntary standards. In one illustrative 
example, a seafarer commented “thank God for the MLC [Maritime Labour 
Convention]. Before we were working like dogs”. In another example seafar-
ers complained about the uncomfortable mattresses on board and how these 
were not replaced despite the complaints to the company that had been made. 
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In this context it is worth noting the MLC contains a reference to the need for 
comfortable mattresses as “guidance” and that these are not included under 
MLC as “mandatory”. These examples were described by seafarers as tangible 
indicators of management priorities and the extent to which seafarers’ health 
and welfare were regarded as less important than other factors such as profits 
and the environment. Thus lost time injuries did matter to the company but 
whether or not seafarers had adequate rest was of less importance.
Case study company priorities for CSR
In summarizing the case studies, it is apparent that in the two largest owner/
operator companies, Vizla and Swan, there was a concern to be seen to be 
exercising CSR in relation to the protection of the environment. In the case 
of both companies, this drive appeared to be fuelled by a perception that envi-
ronmental issues mattered to charterers and that apparent commitment to the 
protection of the environment was ultimately a route to the achievement of a 
“competitive edge”. This desire to exceed regulatory minimum standards did 
not extend to health and safety, as can be seen in Figure 1, which shows the 
objectives of companies with regard to the exercise of policy in particular areas. 
Thus in some areas such as environmental protection,3 companies sought to 
exceed the standards demanded by regulation (going “beyond” compliance) 
and in others they merely sought to meet regulatory minimum standards (see 
Fig. 1). 
At Vizla the prioritization of environmental protection related to the removal 
of limitations on the budget for environmental protection, which was in contrast 
to the operation of strict budget limits in relation to the pursuit of seafarers’ 
health and safety. At Swan, company personnel were clear about the corporate 
priorities which had been articulated in corporate materials and communicated 
to all personnel. Eagle was the only ship management company to be included 
among the case studies and, as such, it had less leeway in terms of the estab-
lishment of priorities. While there were some expressions of a commitment to 
safety over and above other concerns, this aspiration did not seem to be borne 
out in practice. Similarly, while the company wanted to present itself as operat-
ing at the “quality end” of the market, there was an awareness that in order to 
secure contracts for the management of vessels, the company faced cost con-
straints that placed limits on such aspirations.
 3 Specific mention was made of the avoidance of oil pollution and reduction in CO2 
emissions.
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Figure 1  Company priorities vis-à-vis CSR and going beyond regulatory 
compliance
Conclusions
The concern that was identified at Swan, to display environmental awareness 
and “green credentials” in order to satisfy customers, is at odds with some of 
the findings that have been presented in earlier studies of CSR in shipping, 
where research has indicated that shippers and forwarders who represent the 
customers of Swan pay scant attention to environmental issues when select-
ing their ocean carriers (Lammgård and Andersson, 2014; Van den Berg and 
De Langen, 2016). They are generally considered to be much more focused 
on price, which accords with the perception of seafarers and managers based 
within Eagle ship-management (De Langen, 2007; Tongzon, 2009). This dis-
parity in findings (between Swan and Eagle) may relate to the size and public 
profile of Swan. Unlike Eagle, Swan demonstrated a high degree of sensitivity 
to reputation as both a national and international brand. The difference could 
also indicate that as an ocean carrier of choice for some other large well-known 
brands such as Market King, which were also concerned to protect their brands 
in the face of consumer pressure, Swan (unlike Eagle) was forced to respond to 
their “unusual” concerns in this area. 
It seemed that the experience of Eagle was more typical of the container and 
vehicle transport sector in experiencing negligible pressure from charterers 
with regard to environmental protection. While Eagle was aware of charterers’ 
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interest in the secure stowage of cargo and in the cleanliness of the cargo areas 
on board, managers were not under any pressure to demonstrate anything other 
than regulatory compliance with regard to both seafarer and environmental 
protection. This confirms the accounts by some academics of the ways in which 
many shippers and forwarders are currently overlooking the direct benefits of 
environmental protection (Van Den Berg and De Langen, 2016). 
The case of Vizla was different from both Eagle and Swan inasmuch as, in 
prioritizing environmental protection in relation to establishing high voluntary 
standards, senior managers seemed to be motivated primarily by a desire to 
reduce the risks of the very high financial penalties that had been introduced by 
some port states with regard to pollution incidents. For Vizla the pursuit of regu-
latory compliance in relation to all matters was a necessary feature of operation 
within the highly regulated tanker sector, where charterers operated their own 
inspections and codes of practice over and above those established via interna-
tional regulation. Within these regulatory regimes they nevertheless aspired to 
go beyond compliance with regard to concern to protect the environment, but 
here they appeared to be motivated by the potential financial consequences of 
environmental damage rather than by international regulations as such. They 
wanted to do whatever they could to reduce the risks of environmental con-
tamination, because they feared the huge fines that could be imposed by states 
following pollution incidents. 
In the case studies described here, none of the managers or seafarers iden-
tified direct positive links between financial performance and environmental 
performance per se, despite the fact that this has been identified as a positive 
feature of CSR by some authors (Molina-Azorín et al., 2009).4  This can pos-
sibly be explained in the context of research findings which indicate that there 
is little appetite among charterers for environmental performance that comes 
at a financial cost (Fries et al., 2009). Thus companies such as Swan perhaps 
see the enhancement of their reputation as the main benefit of environmental 
protection, while understanding that unless it comes with competitive pric-
ing it is unlikely to yield benefits with regard to financial performance overall 
(Cariou, 2011; Lättilä et al., 2013). This perception is endorsed by evidence that 
companies do not consider shifting to alternative modes of transport as a result 
of environmental considerations (Large et al., 2013; Lammgård and Andersson, 
2014) and, by the same token, when they do shift it is in pursuit of reduced costs 
and higher service levels (Eng-Larsson and Kohn, 2012).
Whether it came as a result of the pursuit of high reputation (and therefore 
greater marketability to charterers) or as a result of a desire to avoid damaging 
(and potentially bankrupting) fines following cargo spillage, the evidence from 
the case studies indicates that seafarers are right to lament, as they frequently 
do, that “they”, by which they mean the public, the companies, and the regu-
lators, “care more about seabirds than they care about us”. They identify that 
 4 The lack of such identification was particularly curious given the awareness across the 
industry of the degree to which slow steaming not only impacts CO2 emissions, but also 
saves a great deal of money in terms of fuel budgets.
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vessels such as Swanland and Cemfjord, which have recently been lost with 
crew-members on board, attract less public interest and live for much shorter 
periods of time in the “public memory” than oil spills such as those caused by 
other vessels in comparable areas, such as Sea Empress and Braer. The evidence 
presented here suggests that it is for these very reasons that companies may 
aspire to the exercise of CSR in relation to environmental issues, while they seek 
mere regulatory compliance when it comes to standards of health, safety and 
welfare. This is strongly indicative of an approach to CSR which is not value-
driven and does not conform with current definitions of CSR as described by 
Carroll (1999) and in the introduction to this article.
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